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INTRODUCTION 
 
Over the last few decades, organisations have been giving their 
employees increasing control over peripheral elements of their working 
arrangements. To illustrate, at the beginning of the 21st century some 
form of teleworking is an option for 24% of Dutch employees (Peters et al. 
2004), and 44% can decide for themselves when they start and finish their 
working day (Breedveld and Van den Broek 2003). In this chapter, 
however, the focus is on flexible benefit plans (FBPs). This form of 
internal flexibility in the composition of pay increases flexibility for the 
employee as opposed to flexibility of the employee, of which short-term 
contracts are an example (Elchardus and Heyvaert 1990). By giving 
employees a choice in the composition of their benefits, FBPs enhance 
flexibility. Employees can add or remove elements, or change the volume 
of a particular element, like number of holidays. FBPs often allow 
employees the opportunity to adjust the balance between time and money 
in their pay. This makes FBPs a useful tool to improve the balance 
between employees’ work and family lives. Flexible benefits also enable 
employees to change the composition of their compensation as their 
situation changes, allowing for useful adaptation of their reward over the 
life course (Schippers 2001). 
Flexible benefits originated in North America, where in the early 1970s 
employers started to look for ways to control the rising costs of their 
benefit plans. In the 1980s, Dow Chemicals was the first organisation in 
the Netherlands to give its employees the option of choice in their 
benefits. The concept took a few years to gain momentum, but by the 
early 1990s more and more organisations were offering their employees 
flexible benefits (Barringer and Milkovich 1998), and from 1995 onwards 
flexible benefit schemes started to take off. A survey amongst employers 
in 2001 revealed that about 40% of organisations offered their employees 
a choice in their benefits (Hay Group 2002). A survey conducted in 2003 
showed that by then about 60% of organisations offered their employees 
some choice in their benefits, and 30% offered extensive choices in terms 
of time and money (Hillebrink 2006). Most of these plans were introduced 
around the turn of the millennium. 
Recent estimations of the percentage of employees that participate in 
FBPs vary. In most Dutch studies, participation rates lie around a quarter 
of employees. A cross-section of Dutch employees revealed that 19% of 
employees with access to an FBP had participated in this system (Van 
Sloten et al. 2005). In one Dutch university, 32% of respondents had used 
the plan (Hillebrink et al. 2004b), while in another participation was around 
20% (Delsen et al. 2006). In the FBP of a particular Dutch insurance 
company, Langedijk (2001) reported an average participation rate of 
around one-third, taken over a four-year period during which the majority 
of respondents had changed their benefits at least once. 
Unlike the American situation, cost control is not among the main 
reasons Dutch organisations consider flexible benefits. In a recent survey 
among Dutch organisations it appeared that the reasons to implement 
flexible benefits are not so much cost-related, but much more employee-
related. Among the organisations that were about to introduce flexible 
benefits, only 9% did so to reduce costs, and in fact, 17% of the 
organisations not offering flexible benefits said it would be too expensive. 
Organisations rather indicated their aim was to improve their 
attractiveness to employees (Hillebrink 2006). Indeed, in her thorough 
investigation of the influence of the introduction of flexible benefits, 
Langedijk (2001) found that employees’ appreciation of their benefits went 
up after such a system was introduced. Remarkably, this effect was 
similar for people who used the system and for non-users. Another reason 
for the implementation of an FBP brought forward by organisations is to 
give their employees more freedom (Hillebrink 2006). The introduction of 
flexibilisation in the composition in pay can therefore be viewed as one of 
the answers to the growing wish of the increasingly diverse workforce in 
our contemporary ‘multiple choice’ society (Breedveld and Van den Broek 
2003) to have more of a say over their benefits in general and their 
working times in particular. With the growing number of women 
participating in the labour market, more (male and female) employees 
combine their professional lives with substantive caring tasks. Depending 
on their specific household situation or life-course phase (Schippers 
2001), employees may prefer a different composition of benefits. FBPs 
are believed to accommodate the growing variation in employee 
preferences. 
However, as Langedijk’s study (2001) showed, having the ‘opportunity 
to choose’ is at least as important for improving employees’ perceived 
value of pay as actually changing one’s benefits. The perceived value of 
benefits goes up just by adding the option of choice. Moreover, the wish 
and opportunity to make an active choice does not necessarily imply that 
people actually do so (Breedveld and Van den Broek 2003; Duyvendak 
and Hurenkamp 2004). The time and effort it takes for employees to study 
the possibilities in the plans and their consequences may be higher than 
the perceived gains. In this chapter we therefore examine what choices 
employees of a department of a Dutch civil-service organisation made in 
their FBPs. We research two elements of their choice behaviour. As little 
is known about who finds the opportunities of an FBP interesting enough 
to participate in it, we firstly analyse who chooses to change their benefits. 
Which employees use the opportunities an FBP offers to adjust their 
benefits to their personal situation and preferences, as organisations 
expect them to do? In a statistical analysis we will examine the effects of 
work and household characteristics on employee participation. We will 
also look into the particular time choices employees make: do they buy or 
sell time? These choices are of particular interest in the context of the 
debate on time competition. In the choices regarding working time and 
non-working time that employees make in these plans, we can see 
whether an FBP enables them to better deal with the various demands 
upon their time. Do these demands arise from the working domain or from 
the household domain? To examine whether flexible benefits are 
facilitating the combination of work and family, and to see which factors in 
their work and home situations particularly influence the choice of time or 
money, we analyse the effects of the work and household characteristics 
of employees on their time choices. 
In the following, we discuss our theoretical model for approaching 
employees’ participation in the plan, and their choices between time and 
money. We conclude with a presentation and discussion of the results. 
 
 
THEORY 
 
In this paper we assume people to act rationally and in a goal-oriented 
fashion. This means that they are expected to make a choice concerning 
their benefits only if this will help them achieve (one of) their goals, given 
their preferences and restraints. There are some limits to this rational 
behaviour, as has been extensively documented by various authors (e.g. 
Conlisk 1996; Simon 1976). Following these authors, we include the 
concept of bounded rationality as a result of incomplete information and 
satisficing behaviour into our model. Employees will only participate in an 
FBP if the costs of making the change are (perceived to be) smaller than 
the increase in value that can be established by it. How and whether 
participating in an FBP may increase the value of their pay depends on 
the goals it enables them to achieve. 
Lindenberg and Frey (1993) have set out the general goals that people 
work towards: physical well-being, consisting of comfort and stimulation, 
and social approval, which they subdivide into status, behavioural 
confirmation and affect. Choices in benefits may help people realise both 
sub-categories of physical well-being: comfort may be achieved by 
increasing one’s income, or by increasing the amount of time off. 
Depending on the quality of the work, stimulation may be enhanced by 
working more, but for other people by working less, if this allows them to 
go skydiving. Choices in benefits may also help people realise each of the 
three sub-categories of social approval. Choosing for more working time 
may improve one’s status at work, for instance. Behavioural approval may 
be achieved by choosing for more leave to look after a terminally ill 
partner, but on the other hand choosing for more working time when times 
are busy at work may invoke behavioural approval from one’s colleagues. 
Affect may make people choose for more time off, so that they can take a 
world trip with their partner, or to work more and trade in the extra hours 
for a computer for their teenage children. 
By changing the composition of their reward and adjusting the balance 
between working and non-working time, employees may improve the 
value of their pay, since it allows them to achieve more of their goals. This 
is called the perceived value of pay (Langedijk 2001; Lazear 1998), since 
it relates to the value in the eyes of the employee, not the actual costs for 
the organisation. This value is influenced by the monetary component of 
the compensation as well as by the amount of leave and other benefits, 
and the expectations employees have of the future development of their 
pay (as a result of promotion or pay rises). 
The choices that people make will depend on the value they attach to 
the elements involved in that trade. Employees will choose for trading in a 
day off for money if they value that free day less than the value of the 
cash they receive (and what it allows them to buy) if they work that day. 
Conversely, an employee may choose for more leave if the value of those 
extra days off is greater to him than the foregone income. Other elements 
of flexible benefit packages, such as the option to save for a sabbatical 
leave or compensation for a computer at home, may have different value 
to different employees, depending on their goals. 
It is important to note that the costs and benefits of changing one’s pay 
extend beyond the benefits themselves. Changing one’s benefits requires 
time and effort. The employee has to study the arrangement, examine 
which option is most interesting, and then make the change. The amount 
of work this involves varies greatly between organisations, but also 
between choices. In the case of trades with little volume, these 
transaction costs may outweigh the gains of the trade, making 
participation uninteresting. 
 
Time and money 
The benefits offered in flexible benefit plans can be grouped into time and 
money. Time usually consists of short-term leave and various leave-days 
saving arrangements. Money can be cash, or come in the shape of a (tax-
free) compensation, for example for travelling expenses or a computer. 
The choices employees can make in an FBP can be classified into four 
groups (Table 11.1). 
All choices have an effect on either the balance between working time 
and non-working time, or income level, or both. We focus here on the 
choices that involve time off and income: trading in time for money or 
money for time. 
 
Household 
The household situation can affect participation in an FBP, and the 
choices people make within it. People in certain situations may be able to 
realise an improvement in the value their compensation has for them, 
while for others such an improvement may not be achieved because the 
standard pay is optimal for them. 
For parents, particularly of young children, flexible benefits may be 
useful in improving their combination of work and care. Adjusting the 
balance between working and non-working time in their compensation 
may make it easier to relieve the strains of what has been dubbed the 
‘rush hour of life’. They may be able to reduce their time pressures at 
home. While there are other arrangements they can use to this end, such 
as working part-time, flexible benefits will allow a fine-tuning of the 
situation. We expect parents with (young) children living in the household 
to participate in the FBP more often. 
When it comes to the choice between time-selling or time-buying, we 
also expect the presence of (young) children to cause an effect. For 
employees who are caring for children, particularly young ones, the value 
of an extra leave day may be much greater than for employees without 
such a responsibility. They will therefore choose more often for buying 
time off than an alternative option. Given that Dutch women generally 
make the greater adjustment to their working hours when children arrive 
(CBS 2004), we expect household effects to be more pronounced for 
women than for men. 
Living with a partner may also make flexible benefits more interesting. 
Employees living with a partner will prefer greater flexibility, because this 
will enhance the coordination of various lives and lead to the attainment of 
more goals, making non-standard benefits more attractive. 
The contribution an employee makes to the household income may be 
particularly relevant. In dual-income households, where there are also two 
sets of benefits, changing the composition of benefits to make them more 
complementary may be very useful. Employees who are responsible for 
most or all of the household income will tend to prefer trading in money for 
time, to increase the household income. Achieving the goal of physical 
well-being for oneself and one’s dependents will become more important 
if this depends on one single income, so enhancement of this income will 
be more likely to outstrip other goals that might be achieved through 
different choices. 
 
Work 
Depending on specific job situations, employees are expected to make 
different choices regarding their benefits, since their job construct will also 
affect their ability to improve their perceived value of pay through 
participation in an FBP. The working situation will also contribute to the 
specific goals employees may wish to achieve. 
Participation in the FBP is expected to increase with the number of 
contractual hours. Employees with a full-time position receive more 
benefits (in absolute terms) than employees who only work two days a 
week. For the full-time employees an end-of-year payment, for instance, 
is larger, so trading it in for something else becomes more interesting. 
This effect applies to a number of possible choices, and thereby 
employees can achieve more with the plan as the contractual hours 
increase. 
The wages people earn will also affect their participation, since in this 
system, as in most FBPs, the value of leave is dependent on the hourly 
wage. A higher hourly wage encourages more participation, because 
trades can become more substantial. If a receptionist and a manager both 
wish to acquire a computer through the flexible benefit plan, for instance, 
and trade in leave for it, the receptionist has to trade in more time than the 
manager. In terms of time, the computer is more expensive for the 
secretary. This will not only make the plan as a whole more interesting for 
people with a higher wage, it will also make them prefer trading in time for 
money. The higher value of an extra day worked (in monetary terms) will 
make selling time off more attractive, and buying extra time off a relatively 
expensive undertaking. 
The choices in benefits will not merely be influenced by the monetary 
compensation employees receive for their labour. It may sometimes 
appear that money is the only thing employees will work for, though it is 
safe to say that this is something of a simplification. Intrinsic motivation 
and other job valuation aspects will also influence the preferences 
employees have towards their benefits and the goals they can achieve, 
particularly those concerning their balance between working time and time 
off. Doing one’s work well will be more important depending on the degree 
of satisfaction the job brings, for instance. 
Frey (1997) approaches the relation between intrinsic motivation and 
compensation with the help of principal-agent theory and crowding-out 
theory. He posits that people need either an intrinsic or an extrinsic 
reason for working. Employers give their employees the opportunity to 
improve extrinsic motivation for their labour, which should be more 
attractive to people with a low intrinsic motivation. People with a high 
intrinsic motivation will be less interested in improving their pay because 
they receive more of a reward from work itself. 
The effects of intrinsic motivation and the pleasure of work on the 
choice between more or less leave can also be approached from another 
angle, namely that of ‘flow’. Flow is a concept developed by 
Czikszentmihalyi (1999), and refers to a situation where one is totally 
engrossed by what one is doing, to such an extent that one loses all 
sense of time and place. Since this is a pleasurable experience, people 
will strive towards a situation that recreates this experience. 
Bakker applied this concept to work. To this end, he defines it as ‘a 
short-term peak experience which is characterised by absorption, 
enjoyment of the job and intrinsic motivation’ (2005:27). Enjoyment of the 
activity of work is experienced by employees who have a very positive 
judgement on their work. Absorption refers to the state of being so 
wrapped up in a task that a person no longer notices what is going on 
around her. Intrinsic motivation leads to work itself becoming a motivation 
and a goal to be achieved. Because it brings them more rewards, people 
who experience more flow at work should have a greater preference for 
extending their working time, and therefore will sell their leave more often. 
Another element influencing job valuation is workload, and this may 
affect the choices employees make towards benefits – their leave in 
particular. People who experience a high workload may feel unable to 
take all the leave they have each year, choosing more often to trade it in 
for another benefit. The value of this leave they are unable to take is 
relatively low for them, making it a cheap source benefit. It should 
therefore be easy to find something on the goal-side of the plan that is of 
greater value, and employees with a high workload will also participate in 
the plan more often. 
Commitment to the organisation may be interesting in this context too. 
Ellemers et al. (1998) developed a three-way distinction of commitment, 
separating organisational commitment from career-oriented and team-
oriented commitment. They showed that these are separate types of 
commitment, related to different constituencies within the organisation, 
the goals and advancements of which they support and promote: the 
organisation as a whole, the team within which one works, and the 
individual level, the career. For purposes of the current study we examine 
the effect of organisational commitment on the choices regarding flexible 
benefits. When one is highly committed to the organisation, its goals 
become closely tied to one’s own. A high level of commitment to the 
organisation may thus lead to a decision to not buy extra time off, and 
even sell days off, to promote the goals of the organisation. 
 
Figures 11.1 and 11.2 depict the theoretical models. 
  
METHOD AND DATA 
 
The data for this research was gathered amongst employees of a large 
department of the Dutch civil service, in early 2003. An aselect, 
representative sample of 1030 employees received a questionnaire at 
their home address. There was a response of 40%, with 409 
questionnaires returned. As a result of missing values we used 383 
questionnaires for the analyses. 
The questionnaire 
Respondents were asked their personal characteristics: gender, year of 
birth (which we recoded into age), and their highest completed level of 
education. On the topic of their household situation we asked them 
whether they lived with a partner, whether this partner had paid 
employment and whether there were children in their household (as well 
as their ages). These variables were recoded into five dichotomous 
variables: partner, working partner, youngest child in the household 
younger than 4, youngest child in the household between 4 and 12, 
youngest child aged 12 or older. We chose these ages because Dutch 
children go to primary school at age 4 and secondary school at 12, which 
affects the time demands in the household. If the partner had paid 
employment, we asked the percentage of the household income that this 
partner contributed (less than 25%, around 25%, around 50% or more 
than 50%). In order to include single employees in our analyses we 
recoded this variable into the percentage of the household income 
contributed by the employee (more than 75%, around 75%, around 50% 
or less than 50%). 
Respondents were asked in detail about their work situation. The 
number of contractual hours was asked as an open question. 
Respondents were asked to indicate their income on a 20-category 
answer. To measure workload we used the JCQ scale (Karasek et al. 
1998). This scale contains questions such as ‘Do you frequently have to 
work very fast?’ Respondents could answer on a four-point scale, ranging 
from ‘(almost) never’ to ‘always’ (Cronbach’s α = 0.76). To measure 
organisational commitment we used the scale developed by Ellemers et 
al. (1998). This scale contains statements such as ‘I feel like I belong with 
this organisation’, which respondents could agree or disagree with on a 
five-point scale (Cronbach’s α = 0.84). To measure flow at work we used 
the scale as developed by Bakker (2005). Examples of statements are: 
‘My work makes me feel good’, ‘When I work I forget everything around 
me’ and ‘I do my job without wondering what it brings me’. The same five-
point scale was used for these statements as for commitment. Cronbach’s 
α was 0.82 for the enjoyment scale, 0.79 for absorption and 0.77 for 
intrinsic motivation. 
 
Respondents 
Respondents were 45 years old on average, and mostly male (70.2%). 
Both in terms of age and gender, the dataset is representative for the 
organisation as a whole. The average educational level was intermediate 
vocational (MBO). Most respondents lived with a partner (85.4%); 80.4% 
had paid employment. Almost two-thirds of the employees lived in a 
household with children (61%). In one out of five of these households the 
youngest child was under age 4, in 40.5% the children were 12 or older. 
Practically all respondents had a permanent contract; only a very tiny 
minority had a contract for a limited period (1.6%). The average 
respondent had been working at this department for 22 years (56% for 21 
years or longer), putting in 36.3 hours per week, 1.9 hours of which are 
overtime. 
The FBP in this organisation had been in place for two years when we 
approached our respondents. The plan in this organisation offered two 
basic options. One was to choose for a tax-free compensation, for 
instance for a PC or additional childcare expenses. For these 
compensations, employees could trade in a part of their income and could 
choose from various sources: holiday money, compensation for travelling 
costs, or leave. Additionally, the plan offered employees the choice of 
working more or fewer hours, on a yearly basis. Extra hours were paid out 
in the hourly wage, hours that are reduced were taken out of the monthly 
wage. The option of extending the various leave arrangements offered 
outside of the FBP were not (yet) integrated into the flexible benefit plan. 
People could change their benefits once a month. There were clear 
restrictions on the changes that could be made. Working time could not 
be reduced by more than 10 days, and extensions were limited to 100 
hours per year and 40 hours per week. The number of leave days that 
could be traded in for another goal was also restricted, although the exact 
number depends on the age of the employee (since this influences the 
amount of leave). The youngest employees (on a full-time contract) could 
trade in about three days. There were also legal restrictions applying to 
this flexible benefit plan, as they do to all: income before taxes could not 
sink below the official minimum wage, and only days in surplus to the 
legal minimum of annual leave could be traded. 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
Descriptive 
 
Participation in this organisation’s flexible benefits model is high: 47% of 
respondents to the questionnaire had made a change in their benefits in 
2002. An internal review showed that 34% of employees participated in 
2001. On the basis of this review, changes were made in the presentation 
of the plan to employees, and the number of choice moments was raised 
from 2 to 12 per year; the higher participation level we found may be a 
result of these changes. There is no reason to believe that there is an 
over-representation of participants in the dataset. Data was collected as 
part of a wider research project into work-family arrangements, and 
participation in the flexible benefit plan was only one of several topics 
addressed in the questionnaire. 
Nearly three-quarters (73%) of the respondents who had participated in 
the flexible benefit plan had made a choice that involved time, mostly 
trading in leave for another benefit. Two-thirds (66.1%) of the respondents 
who had participated in the plan used time off as a source benefit, either 
by trading in leave or by working more hours per week. More than half of 
the respondents (51.7%) chose for a financial source, 33 people chose for 
both kinds of sources. In terms of the goals that people chose there was 
far less variety. Almost all participants chose a financial goal (95.6%), 
usually a PC: 56.7% of participants made this choice, and 21.1% opted 
for a bicycle. There were very few people who chose extra time off 
(7.2%), and there were far fewer who chose for both kinds of goals. Only 
five people chose a time and a financial goal. Table 11.2 shows the 
combinations between the sources and goals that people chose in terms 
of time and money. 
 
Explanatory 
In a binary logistic regression we tested our model to see which variables 
affected participation in the flexible benefit plan (Table 11.3). Because the 
effects of young children were expected to be more pronounced for 
women, we decided to estimate the model separately for men and for 
women. Gender correlated with several other independent variables, not 
just with the presence of children. The analyses were controlled for age, 
educational level and job level. 
While men participated in the FBP far more often (54.3% compared to 
29.8% of women), participation in an FBP is affected by more variables of 
our model for women than for men. It is not uncommon for such results to 
appear. A similar difference between the sexes frequently turns up in 
labour supply research, where men behave more or less identically, and 
women react more clearly to their circumstances (and preferences) by 
changing their labour market participation (Killingsworth 1983; Grift and 
Siegers 1992). 
The findings support some of our hypotheses: on the household side, 
the presence of children made changing benefits more attractive, as we 
expected. The age of these children had different effects for both sexes. 
Women participated more often when their children were young, and only 
if wider margins of statistical significance are applied (an N of 114 is very 
small for logistic regression) did other mothers also change their benefits 
more often. For men this was only more appealing when they had older 
children. Men with a working partner also changed their benefits more 
often, for women this had no effect. Almost all women in this group have a 
working partner. 
Female employees participated in the FBP according to their job 
situation, men did not. The increase in participation as the number of 
contractual hours goes up fits in with our hypothesis, although income did 
not have the expected effect. Workload had no effect. Intrinsic motivation 
has a negative effect on female participation in the model, as 
hypothesised based on the theory of Frey. The more intrinsically 
motivated women exhibit a dimmer enthusiasm for increasing their 
extrinsic reward. Women in higher job levels also changed their benefits 
more often. 
Due to the fact that very few people in this organisation chose to trade 
in a financial benefit for more time off, this group could not be analysed 
separately. For the analysis of the decision to trade in time for money, we 
also performed a logistic regression analysis (see Table 11.4). Time 
sellers here are people who chose to trade in leave or work more hours 
for a financial benefit. Because the different age categories for the 
youngest child had no effect, they were replaced by a single variable for 
children in the household to improve model parsimony. 
Work factors have a stronger effect on the decision to trade in leave for 
another benefit, and thus extend working time; there were no household 
factors that had a statistically significant effect. First of all, the number of 
contractual hours play a role, which we did not expect. The more hours 
people work, the more often they chose to extend their working time. This 
may be evidence of a pulling effect of work. This does not take place in 
emotional terms though. Employees with a higher organisational 
commitment chose to extend their working time less often. The same 
goes for employees who enjoy their work. Both these effects are contrary 
to our expectations. Employees who are intrinsically motivated chose 
more often for trading in time for money, as expected. 
One may wonder about the causal relationship between these job 
valuation measures and benefit choices: job valuation could be affected 
by increasing the value of pay via an FBP. Benefit satisfaction has been 
shown to increase after the introduction of an FBP, but this was equally so 
for those who had and those who hadn’t changed their benefits (Langedijk 
2001), suggesting that participation itself does not affect satisfaction. 
These relationships could be better understood in a longitudinal study. 
Because there were only 24 women in this data sub-set, separate 
analyses for men and women were not possible. When we attempted 
another method it turned out that two interaction effects were at play, 
between gender and workload and between gender and intrinsic 
motivation. The lack of women in the dataset still made the analyses less 
than perfect, to such an extent that we will refrain from publishing the 
results here. Still, the suggestion from the data is that here, too, women 
react more strongly to their circumstances than men, particularly to their 
workload and intrinsic motivation. For men, the effect of workload on the 
decision to trade in leave was close to zero; women chose this option 
more often when their workload was high. Regarding intrinsic motivation, 
the effect points in the same direction for both sexes, namely that when 
intrinsic motivation increases, people chose more often to trade time for 
money, though the effect is much stronger for women than for men. 
Further research will hopefully allow us to shed more light on this matter. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Flexible benefits provide employees with the opportunity to adapt the 
composition of their pay to their preferences. In the present study we 
analysed who had changed their benefits and who had traded in time off 
for a financial benefit. In this final section we will reflect on our findings. 
In the department of civil service researched in this study, almost half of 
the respondents changed their benefits. Strikingly, participation was 
higher among men than women. This means that for a reasonably large 
group of employees, especially men, perceived gains exceed the 
transaction costs associated with participation in the FBP. The model we 
developed went nonetheless further in explaining female participation 
than male participation. It appeared that women responded to their 
individual situation much more than men. Participation of women in the 
plan depended on both their household (motherhood) and work situations 
(contractual hours, job level). Men only participated more often when they 
had older children at home and less often when they lived alone. None of 
the work characteristics included in the present study were significant. It is 
likely that men’s choices of time or money are affected by other issues, 
like institutional factors that were not included in this study. As only 13 
employees traded in money for time, the data only allowed us to analyse 
who had traded in time for money. As most time sellers were men, 
analyses for men and women separately were not possible. When 
including gender interactions, however, it appeared that women reacted to 
more and different things than men; workload and intrinsic motivation 
were particularly significant factors. 
Strikingly, household characteristics did not affect employees’ choice to 
trade in time for money. Employees with children (regardless of their 
ages) did not make this choice less often than employees without 
children. Obviously, childless employees do not want to augment their 
working hours per se either. Work characteristics did affect employees’ 
choice to sell time. Factors indicating how employees value their job 
(organisational commitment, enjoyment, intrinsic motivation) were shown 
to play an especially significant role, although not always in the way we 
expected. People who really enjoy their work actually traded in time for 
money less often. It is the people who enjoy work less who were 
extending their working time, which is somewhat counterintuitive. 
However, we must be careful not to assume automatically that people 
who trade in time for money necessarily work more hours. It may be that 
the people who really like their work are also extending their working time, 
but simply do not feel the need to be compensated for it. The effect of 
intrinsic motivation undermines this assumption though, as people who 
are intrinsically motivated chose to trade in time for money more often. 
What do our results say about how employees use FBPs as a means to 
better combine work and family life? Looking at participation rates, it 
appears that parents find it more useful to change their benefits than non-
parents. In that sense, the plan acts as a work-family arrangement. 
However, the fact that the most popular choice made by employees was 
trading in time off for a new computer to work at home suggests that the 
majority of participants did not use the FBP to relieve time pressures, but 
rather consider it as an attractive tax arrangement. Of course, whether a 
computer in the home increases employees’ time-spatial flexibility by 
enabling telecommuting and thus has the potential to reduce time 
pressure is not clear beforehand, as it may also increase negative work-
home interference (cf. Peters and Van der Lippe 2005). As the option to 
trade time for a PC has been abolished, participation rates within FBPs 
may diminish in the future. 
Buying time was far less popular than selling time. As it wasn’t possible 
to test a ‘time-buying model’, we are not sure whether we can conclude 
from our study what household characteristics influence men and women 
to prefer more time off, and whether we can conclude that other work-life 
arrangements offered by the organisation, like part-time work, flexible 
hours or home-based telework, suffice to achieve a good work-life 
balance for employees and their households. The organisation in question 
is very generous in this respect, in another organisation a different picture 
may arise. At present, in many Dutch households men work full-time and 
women part-time, the latter providing households the needed flexibility. A 
further rise in women’s labour market participation is likely, and this may 
give FBPs more rationale in the light of balancing work and family in the 
future. Further research is needed to see how parents view FBPs as a 
means to facilitate the combination of work and family, and how they are 
used in combination with other work-life balance arrangements. 
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